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Abstract
We study the role of distressed bank debt in aecting the outcome of Swedish bankruptcy auc-
tions. The auction determines the going-concern premium, i.e., the premium over the piecemeal
liquidation value to be paid for the right to acquire the bankrupt rm as a going concern. We
show that since the distressed debt is akin to an equity position ('creditor toehold'), the bank
has an incentive to nance a bidder and to induce the coalition to overbid. Moreover, the
coalition's optimal bid equals the revenue-maximizing reservation price of a monopolist seller
of the bankrupt rm. The empirical analysis identies signicant creditor toehold eects: the
greater the toehold, the greater the winning going-concern premium, as predicted. Moreover,
controlling for the creditor toehold, there is no evidence that the going-concern premium is lower
in business cycle downturns, in distressed industries, for sales back to the rm's old owners, or
when sold to industry outsiders. Thus, there is no support for asset re-sale arguments, possibly
because bidding with creditor toehold helps counteract re-sale tendencies in relatively illiquid
auctions.
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"...the policy of automatic auctions for the assets of distressed rms, without the possi-
bility of Chapter 11 protection, is not theoretically sound", Shleifer and Vishny (1992).
1 Introduction
In Sweden, insolvent rms that fail to restructure their debt claims out-of-court are sold in a cash-
only bankruptcy auction. The auction establishes the going-concern premium, i.e., the premium
over the piecemeal liquidation value to be paid for the right to acquire the bankrupt rm as a going
concern. These auctions typically involve multiple bidders: as shown below, the number of actual
bids in going-concern sales averages 3 with an additional 3 bidders expressing interest in bidding.
The economic eciency of this mandatory auction system is an important but controversial issue.
As pointed out by Jensen (1991), Bradley and Rosenzweig (1992)) and others, a mandatory auction
system avoids costly pro-management biases inherent in a Chapter-11 type of system with court-
supervised debt renegotiations. This argument receives empirical support by Thorburn (2000). She
nds that Swedish bankruptcy auctions have relatively low direct costs and produces favorable debt
recovery rates and going-concern survival rates compared to Chapter 11 cases. On the other hand,
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Aghion, Hart, and Moore (1992) argue that liquidity problems
and lack of competition tend to promote asset re-sales, a possibility not directly addressed by
Thorburn's evidence. Stromberg (2000) reports that sale-backs of bankrupt rms to their old
owners increase in periods of industry distress in Sweden, and conjectures that such sale-backs
help avoid asset re-sales. However, direct evidence on the re-sales hypothesis in the context of
bankruptcy auctions is elusive.
1
Stromberg (2000) recognizes that the bank has an incentive to inuence the sale of the bankrupt
rm and that this incentive depends on the bank's expected recovery rate. However, his analysis
treats auction prices as exogenous to the bank, thus ignoring a potentially important price impact of
the bank's incentives. In this paper, we instead model optimal bidding strategies and show that the
nal auction price indeed depends on the bank's actions. Exploiting the nature of distressed debt as
an equity position|or 'creditor toehold'|in the bankrupt rm, we show that this toehold induces
1
Evidence on the re-sale hypothesis is sparse regardless of the context. A notable exception is Pulvino (1998),
who nds that airplane sales take place at relatively low prices (relative to a model-price benchmark) in periods of
industry distress. See also Maksimovic and Phillips (1998) for an interesting examination of asset re-sale arguments
using company plant data.
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the bank to form a bidder coalition that bids aggressively. This is analogous to the results derived by
Burkart (1995) and Singh (1998) in the context of takeover bidding with (exogenous) equity toeholds
and private bidder valuations.
2
In addition, we link this toehold eect to standard auction theory
by showing that the bank-bidder coalition's optimal bid equals the revenue-maximizing reservation
price by a monopolist seller. The bottom line is that the impaired debt claim pushes the bank to get
involved in the bankruptcy auction in order to maximize the winning bid. To our knowledge, this
possibility has been largely overlooked in the literature that warns of illiquidity and asset re-sales
in bankruptcy auctions.
Our empirical analysis shows that the bank frequently nances a bidder in the auction, and it
reveals a signicant impact of the bank's toehold on the winning bid premium. The bid premium is
the ratio of the winning bid value to the piecemeal liquidation value, where the latter is provided by
the bankruptcy trustee's value estimate published at the start of the auction. Thus, at the beginning
of the auction, bid strategies are conditioned on the debt recovery rate implied by the piecemeal
liquidation value estimate. This 'initial recovery rate' is common knowledge and exogenously given
by the bankruptcy event.
3
As a result, the cross-sectional variation (across auctions) in this recovery
rate fully captures the incentives of the banks in the auction. The empirical results support the
theoretical prediction that the greater the bank's incentive to participate in the auction, the greater
the winning going-concern premiums (through overbidding). We also nd that bank nancing of
the winning bid has a positive impact on the winning bid premium beyond the toehold eect.
These results also reject the claim by Stromberg (2000) that bank involvement in the auction is
detrimental to the interest of other junior creditors.
Controlling for toehold eects, we address the re-sale hypothesis of Shleifer and Vishny (1992).
This hypothesis maintains that rms tend to le for bankruptcy at a time when there is widespread
illiquidity in the rm's industry. As a result, the rm risks being sold to industry outsiders that may
be less ecient in managing the rm's assets and thus may place relatively low bids in the auction.
We examine whether the going-concern premium depends on buyer identity, industry liquidity and
2
Bulow, Huang, and Klemperer (1999) analyze overbidding with equity toeholds in common-value auctions, and
Betton and Eckbo (2000) perform a large-sample empirical analysis of the eects of equity toeholds on takeover bids.
3
The initial recovery rate is exogenous in that it does not reect prior strategic debt trades anticipating the
bankruptcy auction. Swedish debt markets are illiquid and "vulture funds" do not exist. The exogeneity of the initial
creditor toehold contrasts with the endogenous nature of equity toeholds in corporate takeover contests which are
often acquired through a complex dynamic strategy prior to the contest itself [Betton and Eckbo (2001)].
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aggregate demand conditions represented by the business cycle. As argued by Maksimovic and
Phillips (1998), while bankruptcies may be caused by inecient management, they may also be
a result of low product demand (which aect ecient rms as well). Thus, the probability of
inecient bankruptcy outcomes (such as asset re-sales) should be greater in periods of depression.
Our sample period includes two distinct business cycle regimes in Sweden{a boom followed by a
major recession. Overall, we nd no support for the re-sale argument. Since our model suggests
that banks have a greater incentive to "make the market" for the auctioned rm the more severely
distressed their debt claim, a consistent explanation for this evidence is that bidding with creditor
toehold eectively counteracts a tendency for asset-re sales.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the incentives of the bankrupt
rm's bank, derives optimal bidding strategies for a coalition between this bank and a bidder in
the auction, and summarizes the central empirical hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 provides a
description of the Swedish auction bankruptcy system and of our data. Section 4 presents test of
empirical hypotheses related to the bank's bidding and renancing behavior, as well as the asset
re-sale hypothesis. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Creditor toeholds and overbidding
2.1 Theory
Swedish bankruptcy auctions are open, ascending (English) auctions. A result in auction theory is
that, with costless bidding, the outcome of this auction structure is equivalent to the outcome of
a second-price, sealed-bid auction.
4
In a second-price auction, the winner pays the price at which
all other bidders drop out. The same result emerges from a rst-price ascending auction where the
highest-valuation bidder eventually wins by matching the second-highest valuation bidder's nal
price. We follow Hirshleifer (1995) and refer to this as the "ratchet solution". For simplicity, the
analysis below uses the second-price auction analogy.
We assume that the number of bidders is exogenously determined at two.
5
The two bidders
1 and 2 value the bankrupt rm at v
1
 v
l
+ 
1
and v
2
 v
l
+ 
2
, respectively, where v
l
is a
4
See, e.g., Burkart (1995). Klemperer (2000) provides an extensive review of auction theory.
5
Thus, we abstract from dynamic entry strategies by non-toehold bidders. As discussed by Bulow, Huang, and
Klemperer (1999) asymmetric toeholds may exacerbate winner's curse problems and deter entry.
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common value component|henceforth labeled the "piecemeal liquidation value". Moreover, 
1
and 
2
are i.i.d. private valuations with distribution and density functions G and g, respectively.
The private valuations represent unique synergy eects emanating from the respective bidders'
specialized resources when combined with the bankrupt rm. Since we interpret v
l
as the piecemeal
liquidation value, the private value components 
1
and 
2
represent the going-concern premium. In
other words, the auction establishes the price to be paid for the right to generate the respective
bidder's private going-concern value.
Suppose the liquidation value v
l
is sucient to pay o all debtholders senior to the rm's bank
but insucient to pay o the bank's own claim. Moreover, suppose the bank is the only creditor
in its priority class. In this case, the bank is eectively the "residual claimant" and a monopolist
seller of the rm in the auction. Proposition 1 derives the revenue-maximizing reservation price of
such a seller in our auction setting.
Proposition 1 (Monopolist seller's reservation price): Suppose the seller faces
a single bidder whose private value v is distributed according to G(v). Moreover, sup-
pose that the monopolist foregoes the value v
m
by selling the rm. Then, the optimal
reservation price for take-it-or-leave-it oer to purchase the bankrupt rm equals
p

m
= v
m
+
1 G(p

m
)
g(p

m
)
: (1)
Proof: The proof of Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 1. A sales price of p yields expected
revenue of R = p[1   G(p)] and expected marginal revenue of @R=@p = [1   G(p)]   pg(p): The
expected cost equals C = v
m
[1 G(p)],
6
and the expected marginal cost equals @C=@p =  v
m
g(p).
Equating marginal revenue with marginal costs yields the monopolist's reservation price.
7
Enforcing p

m
means refusing to sell the rm (or its assets) at a price below p

m
. In the case
of our bankruptcy auctions, such a commitment is not credible: The auctioneer, whose duciary
responsibility is to maximize total creditor recovery, will in practice consider any bid value in excess
6
The value v
m
may be a competing bid or the seller's own private valuation of the rm.
7
To ensure uniqueness, G must be twice continously dierentiable and satisfy the monotonicity condition
@
@v
i
g(v
i
)
1 G(v
i
)
 0:
4
of the piecemeal liquidation value v
l
. Thus, as a passive bystander, the bank expects to receive the
lesser price equal to the second-highest bidder's valuation (the ratchet solution).
However, suppose the bank enters into a coalition with one of the two bidders, e.g., through a
nancing arrangement with bidder 1. The bank learns v
1
, provides debt-nancing of the bid, and
gets to jointly determine the bid strategy. Proposition 2 shows that the coalition optimally overbids
and that the price with overbidding is identical to the monopolist seller's reservation price.
8
Thus,
forming a bidder coalition eectively enforces the bank's reservation price as a seller in the auction.
Proposition 2 (Overbidding with single-creditor coalition): Let b and s denote
the face values of the debt held by the bank and creditors senior to the bank, respectively,
If v
1
 s+ b, then the coalition does not overbid and the optimal price equals p

c
= v
1
.
If v
1
< s+ b, then the coalition overbids:
p

c
= v
1
+
1 G(p

c
)
g(p

c
)
; (2)
and p

c
 s+ b.
Proof: When v
1
 s+ b, the bank receives full recovery and the coalition bids p

c
= v
1
(the ratchet
solution).
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To derive the optimal bid strategy when v
1
< s+ b, denote the coalition payo as 
L
c
and 
W
c
if it loses or wins the auction, respectively, with a bid of p
c
. Given the second-price auction,
if the coalition loses, the winner pays the coalition bid p
c
and the bank recovers the residual after
paying o s to senior creditors:

L
c
= p
c
  s: (3)
If the coalition wins, it receives its valuation v
1
, pays the losing bidder's price p
2
= v
2
, and the
bank recovers the residual p
2
  s:

W
c
= v
1
  p
2
+ (p
2
  s) = v
1
  s: (4)
8
The compensation required to make the bank's coalition partner agree to an overbidding strategy is derived in
Proposition 4, below.
9
In this case, a dollar overbidding would be captured by creditors junior to the bank.
5
The expected prot from bidding p
c
equals

c
= [1 G(p
c
)](p
c
  s) +G(p
c
)(v
1
  s) = [1 G(p
c
)]p
c
+G(p
c
)v
1
  s: (5)
Maximizing w.r.t. p
c
yields the rst-order condition:
@
c
@p
c
= [1 G(p
c
)]  p
c
g(p
c
) + v
1
g(p
c
) (6)
Solving for the optimal price yields the expression for p

c
stated in the Proposition.
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Moreover, it
immediately follows that p

c
 s+ b, because if p

c
> s+ b, an additional dollar overbidding implies
that the coalition bears the full cost of the reduced chance of losing to the rival bidder, while junior
creditors capture the additional dollar when the coalition loses.
11
In our Swedish bankruptcy cases, the bank is always the sole member of its creditor class.
However, the above results are easily extended to the case with multiple creditors in the same debt
class, and where the bank holds only a fraction 0 <  < 1 of the claims b.
12
As shown below, this
reduces the coalition's overbidding.
Proposition 3 (Overbidding with multiple creditors): The smaller the fraction 
of the claims in the bank's debt class that is owned by the bank, the smaller the amount
of overbidding by the bank-bidder coalition:
p

c
= v
1
+ 
1 G(p

c
)
g(p

c
)
 s+ b: (7)
Proof: As in Proposition 2, overbidding occurs only when v
1
 s+ b. The coalition's payos when
10
In the case of the uniform distribution over the interval [0; 1], the optimal bid simplies to
p

c
=
v
1
+ 1
2
:
11
To see that the bank|as a seller|is better o overbidding with the coalition, note that

c
= min[p

c
; v
2
]  s  min[v
1
; v
2
]  s:
That is, since p

c
> v
1
, the bank's revenue from overbidding is greater than the revenue implied by the ratchet
solution.
12
For example, this corresponds to a situation where a subset of same-class creditors form a coalition with man-
agement to acquire a rm out of Chapter 11. This scenario is analyzed by Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1999).
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losing or winning are now scaled with the constant , i.e.,

L
c
= (p
c
  s) (8)

W
c
= v
1
  p
2
+ (p
2
  s) = v
1
  (1  )p
2
  s: (9)
The expected payo equals

c
= [1 G(p
c
)]p
c
+G(p
c
)v
1
  (1  )
Z
p
c
0
p
2
dG(p
2
)  s: (10)
The partial derivative
@
c
@p
c
equals
[1  G(p
c
)]  p
c
g(p
c
) + v
1
g(p
c
)  (1  )p
c
g(p
c
) = [1 G(p
c
)] + v
1
g(p
c
)  p
c
g(p
c
); (11)
which when set equal to zero yields the optimal coalition bid p

c
as stated in the proposition.
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It is interesting to note that the expression for the optimal bid in equation (8) is identical to
the optimal bid by a toehold bidder in a takeover contest derived by Burkart (1995). The intuition
is as follows. Overbidding raises the probability of winning the auction at a price exceeding the
bidder's private valuation. In the case of our bank-bidder coalition, the fraction  of the resulting
overpayment cost is recovered by the bidding coalition (it is paid to the bank). Similarly,  of the
overpayment cost in the case of Burkart (1995)'s equity toehold bidder is "recovered" as the bidder
only bids for 1   of the target shares. In both cases, the overbidding cost falls as  increases.
In the case of our bidder coalition, the value of  may very well equal one (as in our Swedish
data). However, for equity toeholds, the range of values of  producing overbidding is limited by
the bidder's willingness to sell his toehold should the bid fail. For example, overbidding is unlikely
to take place in a minority buyout where the majority owner is prepared to pay the minority
shareholders' reservation price.
14
The above analysis assumes that the bank's coalition partner (bidder 1) agrees to a bidding
13
With uniform distributions over [0; 1],
p

c
=
v
1
+ 
1 + 
:
14
Recall that overbidding requires a rival bidder to purchase your toehold should your bid fail. Minority buyouts
attract rival bids only if the minority buyout attempt signals that the entire target rm is being put up for sale.
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strategy that maximizes the total coalition payo. Since bidder 1 derives no gain from overbidding,
the bank must agree to bear the full coalition cost of overbidding. For example, this can be
accomplished by reducing the expected value of the bank's debt claim issued on bidder 1 by the
full amount of the coalition's expected overbidding cost.
Proposition 4 (Expected overbidding cost): The expected overbidding cost (borne
by the bank) is given by
Z
p

c
v
1
(p
2
  v
1
)dG(p
2
) = (p

c
  v
1
)g(p

c
): (12)
Proof: As illustrated in Figure 2, overbidding is costless for the coalition when it loses the contest to
the rival bidder. Moreover, winning with overbidding is also costless when the winning price equals
the valuation of the second-best bidder (i.e., when overbidding results in the ratchet solution).
However, overbidding is costly for the coalition in the single inecient outcome in Figure 2, where
the coalition wins paying a price exceeding its own private valuation v
1
. Thus, the expected cost
of overbidding equals the overpayment p
2
  v
1
times the cumulative probability that the second
bidder's valuation v
2
is in the interval [v
1
; p

c
], which is shown in the proposition. Notice also that
this value equals the shaded triangular area in Figure 1 under the demand curve and above the
monopolist's opportunity cost over the range [1 G(p

m
); 1  G(v
m
)]:
It is not uncommon for the owners of small rms in Sweden to raise bank nancing by personally
guaranteeing the bank loan. If such an owner decides to bid for the bankrupt rm, the bidder
eectively has a toehold much like the bank itself. If the bank forms a coalition with such a bidder,
then the above analysis goes through with the exception that the bank no longer compensates
the coalition bidder for the full overbidding cost. This follows because the greater bank recovery
resulting from (successful) overbidding also reduces the equityholders liability vis-a-vis the bank.
Note also that if the bank-bidder coalition faces competition from a bidder with a personal loan
guarantee, then both bidders in the auction have an incentive to overbid.
2.2 Hypotheses
H1 (Toehold bidding): Let ln(p=v
l
) denote the going-concern premium over the
piecemeal liquidation value v
l
paid by the winning bidder in the auction. Ceteris paribus,
8
ln(p=v
l
) is decreasing in the bank's recovery rate r
l
implied by the piecemeal liquidation
value, where r
l
 max[0;min[(v
l
  s)=b; 1].
Motivation: Recall that the bank has an incentive to form a coalition and overbid only when
v
1
< s+ b, i.e., when 
1
< 

1
 max[s+ b  v
l
; 0]. Thus, for the purpose of computing the expected
amount of overbidding, the relevant range for 
1
is [0; 

1
]. For a given v
l
, the expected amount of
overbidding is given by
Z


1
0
1 G(
1
)
g(
1
)
d
1
: (13)
Since the limit 

1
is decreasing in v
l
, the expected amount of overbidding is also decreasing in v
l
,
as depicted in the upper part of Figure 3. Note also that for r
l
> 0,
r
l
= 1 


1
b
: (14)
Thus, when regressing (cross-sectionally) the going-concern premium ln(p=v
l
) paid by the winning
bidder on the bank's recovery rate at the liquidation value r
l
, the predicted sign of the regression
coecient is negative. The lower part of Figure 3 illustrates the decrease in the amount of expected
overbidding as v
l
approaches the limit s+ b.
The prediction summarized in H1 is a direct consequence of our assumed auction structure.
Stromberg (2000) provides a competing set of assumptions concerning the sale of the bankrupt
rms. Specically, in Stromberg's analysis, the bankrupt rm is either sold back to the rm's old
owners (a "sale-back") at a certain price or it is "liquidated" in an open auction. The sale-back
price is exogenously given as the expected auction (liquidation) price. While the sale-back option
is risk free, the liquidation auction has downside risk for the bank which is greater the higher the
bank's debt recovery at the expected liquidation price. This induces a bias in favor of a sale-back
for high expected debt recovery rates. We summarize this prediction as follows:
H2 (Sale-back bias): As in Stromberg (2000), suppose the bank has the option of
selling the rm back to the old owners at a price equal to the expected price of an open
bankruptcy auction. The likelihood of sale-backs decreases with the number of potential
bidders, and increases with the bank's expected recovery rate. Moreover, since the sale-
9
back takes place without competing bids, the going-concern premium in the average sale-
back price is lower than the average premium produced by going-concern auctions.
Finally, we examine the asset re-sale argument of Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and others. This
hypothesis maintains that rms tend to le for bankruptcy at a time when there is widespread
illiquidity in the rm's industry. As a result, the rm risks being sold to industry outsiders that
may be less ecient in managing the rm's assets and thus may place relatively low bids in the
auction.
H3 (Fire-sales): The going-concern premium ln(p=v
l
) established in bankruptcy auc-
tions decreases with industry distress, with business cycle downturns, and is lower when
the buyer in the auction is an industry outsider.
We now turn to an empirical analysis of these hypotheses.
3 Swedish auction bankruptcy: Structure and data
3.1 Auction structure
Figure 4 illustrates key potential outcomes in a Swedish rm's process towards being sold in a
bankruptcy auction, starting with the point of insolvency. The insolvent rm (i.e., a rm where
the face value of debt claims exceeds the market value of the assets) may rst consider attempting
to use the composition option (event 1) provided by Swedish insolvency law. This option allows the
rm to renegotiate the debt claim of junior (unsecured) creditors. However, successful composition
is elusive as senior creditors are not part of the proposal and need not agree unless they are oered
full repayment. Since anything less than full repayment implies a wealth transfer from senior to
junior creditors, composition is almost never attempted. Indeed, Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) report
300 bankruptcy lings but only four successful composition attempts in the population of 1,650
nancially distressed Swedish rms with at least 20 employees during 1990-92.
Failing composition, the rm may explore the potential for negotiating an out-of-court sale of
the rm's assets as a going concern (event 2). This negotiation is typically initiated by the owner-
manager and is subject to approval by secured creditors, which include the rm's main bank.
Following this sale, the rm is still insolvent (the cash proceeds from the sale are necessarily less
10
than the face value of outstanding debt) and must thus le for bankruptcy (event 3). This ling
represents a prepackaged bankruptcy solution ("auction prepack") since the assets have already been
sold.
15
The role of the bankruptcy court in this instance is primarily to allow junior creditors to
object to the sale and, if the sale is disproved, to organize an open auction. Empirically, auction
prepack lings are almost never overturned.
Thorburn (2000) shows that auction prepacks have signicantly lower direct costs than a regular
bankruptcy ling. Thus, it is natural to assume that a regular auction bankruptcy ling (event 4)
signals a failed prepack attempt.
16
Thorburn (2000) examines whether this signal manifests itself in
dierent recovery rates across prepacks and regular going-concern sales. She reports that prepacks
have lower direct bankruptcy costs. However, she fails to nd any other substantive dierence in
the auction outcomes.
When ling for regular auction bankruptcy, the incumbent management team is replaced by
an independent, court-appointed, professional trustee who has a formal duciary duty towards
creditors. Trustees are certied by a government supervisory authority ("Tillsynsmyndigheten i
Konkurs" or TSM), who reviews the trustees' compensation and performance. Poorly performing
trustees (e.g., in terms of their eorts to maintain the bankruptcy auction) risk losing their license.
Trustees are also subject to the wrath of major creditors should they appear not to maintain a
proper auction procedure. Thus, collusion between owner-managers and the trustee, e.g., in a sale-
back to the old owners, places the individual trustee's reputation at risk. Trustees are compensated
on an hourly basis.
The trustee organizes the sale of the rm in an open, ascending (English) auction, either as a
going concern (event 5) or piecemeal liquidation (event 6). A going concern sale takes place by
merging the assets and operations of the rm into a receiving company set up or held by the buyer,
akin to a leverage buyout transaction.
17
The method of payment is restricted to cash only, and
creditors are paid strictly according to the absolute priority of their claims.
While in bankruptcy, and before the asset sale, the rm is protected by an automatic stay of
15
As reported by Thorburn (2000), the asset sale is typically completed the day before{or on the day of{the
bankruptcy ling. In Sweden, the trustee's popularly refer to auction prepacks as "knockout bankruptcy".
16
An important reason for a failed prepack attempt is insucient time, following insolvency, to line up a buyer and
generate the support of the major creditors.
17
Thus, the rm's assets are transferred to the buyout rm while the debt claims remain on the books of the rm
in bankruptcy.
11
creditors (i.e., debt service is halted and creditors cannot seize collateral.) Furthermore, debtor-
in-possession nancing is permitted.
18
As a result, the rm can maintain its operations while
in bankruptcy and raise new capital through debt issues with super-priority status. In practice,
bankrupt rms tend to cover operating expenses by increasing their debt obligations in the form
of trade credits (which get super-priority), while new debt issues or bank loans are almost never
observed.
19
In Figure 4, the going-concern-sale event contains four separate sub-categories, classied as to
who buys the rm (old versus new owner) and who nances the buyer (old versus new bank).
With this classication, we address issues concerning the bank's incentive to nance the buyer, and
whether the winning bid in the auction reects the incentives to overbid, as discussed above. These
issues are discussed below.
3.2 Data sources and characteristics
The starting point for our sample of Swedish bankruptcies is the original Stromberg and Thor-
burn (1996) data base also underlying Thorburn (2000), Thorburn (1999) and Stromberg (2000).
This data set includes a total of 263 bankruptcies from 01/88{12/91, selected from a population of
1,159 bankrupt rms having at least 20 employees. The source of the population is Upplysnings-
Centralen AB (UC), and the Stromberg-Thorburn sample is restricted to bankruptcies in the four
largest administrative provinces in Sweden, including the country's three main metropolitan areas,
Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmo. The sample rms are among the largest in Sweden: only 6%
of Swedish corporations have 20 employees or more. All rms are privately held, and most have
concentrated ownership.
20
Stromberg-Thorburn collect case-specic information from the ocial bankruptcy les kept by
TSM. However, these les do not contain sucient information on key characteristics for this paper,
18
We thank Torgny Hastad, Swedish Supreme Court judge and former professor of law at the University of Uppsala,
for pointing this out to us.
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In Sweden, as in most of Western Europe, bank nancing often take the form of so-called "oating-charge"
secured debt. "Floating charge" does not refer to the interest on the debt but rather to the denition of the assets
pledged as collateral. A "xed-charge" collateral would refer to a case where the debt is secured in a certain asset
(e.g., a building) and represent the typical form of collateral in the U.S.. "Floating-charge" collateral refers to the
movable assets of the rm (machinery, inventory, etc.) which tend to automatically change over time with the rm's
operations.
20
The sample rms are small in absolute terms. The book value of total assets one year prior to ling averages
$2.5 million, and the number of employees averages 43.
12
such as the number of bidders, the duration (number of days) of the auction, and the nancing of
the winning bid (old bank versus new bank). As a result, we requested detailed information from
each individual trustee across the 263 bankruptcies. To date, we have received responses covering
113 individual auctions. As shown in Figure 5, in a substantial number of cases, the number of
potential buyers expressing an interest in submitting a bid exceeds 1. As listed in Table 1, the
average number of interested bidders equals 5.5 with a median of 3. Moreover, as illustrated in
Figure 6, the substantial expression of interest translates into multiple bids (more than one) in a
majority of the auctions. The average number of actual bids equal 3.6 with a median of 2.0. The
duration of the bidding averages 27 days.
When asked to characterize the nature of the auction process itself, the typical response of the
trustees is that the rms are sold in an open, ascending auction. Interestingly, the trustees view
also the typical sale-back as resulting from an open auction procedure, i.e., in competition with
other actual or potential bids. This is important as it conrms our assumption that the bankruptcy
auction process encompasses sale-backs as well as sales to new owners. The view of the trustees is
also directly supported by the frequency distribution for the number of bids shown in Figure 6.
Furthermore, our empirical analysis requires information on the old bank's decision to -
nance the bidder in going-concern auctions. This information is drawn in part from Thorburn
(2000) and from the trustees' responses. The information includes whether the buyer being -
nanced represents the old owner/manager or new investors. Thorburn (2000) collects this informa-
tion from the national register of corporate oating charge claims ("Inskrivningsmyndigheten for
foretagsinteckning"). Of the 200 going concern sales listed in Table 1, the bank nancing of the
winning bid is identied for 117 cases. Also, we incorporate information on the equity ownership
of incumbent CEOs compiled by Thorburn (2000).
Our measures of industry distress exploits the complete nancial statements of the population
of more than 15,000 Swedish rms with at least 20 employees. The industry distress factor is a
continuous variable measuring the fraction of rms in the industry that either reports an interest
coverage ratio less than one or les for bankruptcy in the same calendar year. The industry is
dened on either a 2-digit or a 4-digit level.
21
The source of this information is UC. The industry
information is also used to estimate the relative accounting (operating) performance of bankrupt
21
Swedish industry classications mirrors the SIC code system used in the US.
13
rms.
Finally, we extend the Stromberg-Thorburn data base with information on the business cycle.
We construct a monthly, composite business cycle index from a set of factors that includes consumer
and producer price indices, gross national product, and ination. The source of this information is
Statistics Sweden.
The sample rms represent more than 30 dierent 2-digit SIC groups, with 29% in manufac-
turing industries, 24% in construction and wholesale industries, 10% in the hotel and restaurant
industry, 10% in the transportation industry, and the balance of 27% scattered across a number of
other industries.
Table 1 shows the number of cases across the outcomes depicted in Figure 4. Of the 263
bankrupt rms in the sample, 53 (20%) succeeded in performing a prepack while the remaining
80% submitted a regular auction bankruptcy ling. Of 207 regular lings, 60 (29%) are liquidated
piecemeal and 147 (71%) are sold as a going concern.
22
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Auction premiums and average recovery rates
Table 2 lists the average and median values of the auction premium and total recovery rates
classied by bankruptcy outcome (going-concern sales, prepacks, and piecemeal liquidations) and
the identity of the buyer (old or new owner). We dene the auction premium as the winning bid
price p in percent of the trustee's liquidation value estimate of the assets sold in the auction, v^
a
l
, i.e.,
p=v
a
l
 1. With few exceptions, the auction excludes accounts receivables and other nancial claims,
thus v^
a
l
< v^
l
. Table 2 does not list the value of the going-concern premium for auction prepacks
since the trustee's liquidation value estimate is made when the prepack sales price is known.
The average value of the auction premium ranges from a low of 8% for piecemeal liquidations to a
high of 131% for going-concern sales to old owners (sale-backs). Note that the 8% premium (median
2%) for piecemeal liquidations supports our contention that the trustee's liquidation estimate is
just that; a good estimate of the winning bid value in a piecemeal liquidation auction. Notice also
22
Three regular lings cannot be classied as to their going-concern-sale status due to insucient information in
the court documents.
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that the high premium in sale-backs fails to support arguments suggesting that the bank somehow
short-cuts the auction mechanism by nancing the old owner and acquires the rm at relatively
low prices.
Table 2 also shows the average and median values of three recovery rates. The rst is the total
debt recovery rate (column 2), computed as r  max[0;min[p=f; 1]] 2 [0; 1], where f is the face
value of the rm's total outstanding debt. The average value of r ranges from a low of 26% for
piecemeal liquidations to a high of 40% for going-concern sales to new owners.
23
Furthermore,
column 3 of Table 2 shows the bank's total recovery rate, r
b
 (p  s)=b, which ranges from a low
of 46% in piecemeal liquidations to a high of 77% in auction prepacks. Thus, the bank recovers
substantially more (and junior debt substantially less) than the average for the rm as a whole.
Finally, column 4 lists the bank's recovery rate at the liquidation value dened as r
bv
 (v^
l
  s)=b
where s and b are the face values of the debt senior to the bank and of the bank, respectively.
Note that r
bv
, which is used below to compute the bank's toehold value, represents a lower bound
on the bank's recovery rate since it ignores the going-concern premium produced by the auction.
The average value of r
bv
ranges from a low of 45% in piecemeal liquidations to a high of 67% in
sale-backs.
4.2 Outcome probabilities and expected recovery rates
Let r
n
denote the average bank recovery rate in auction outcome n. Moreover, let 
n
(x
j
) denote
the probability of auction outcome n conditional on some vector of rm-specic characteristics x
j
.
The conditional expected value of the toehold is computed as E(t
j
) =
P
3
n=1

n
(x
j
)

t
n
.
We rst estimate 
n
(x
j
) using the following multinomial logit model across the three main
auction outcomes (piecemeal liquidation, auction prepack, going-concern sale):

jn
= 
n
(x
j
) = exp(x
0
j

n
)=
3
X
n=1
exp(x
0
j

n
) (15)
where 
n
is a (K = 7  1)-vector of parameters. Table 3 gives summary statistics for the seven
23
See Thorburn (2000) for a cross-sectional analysis of the total recovery rates in our sample.
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variables in the vector x, dened as follows:
x
0
 [constant; size; profmarg; secured; float; bcy1991; distress]; (16)
where size is the natural logarithm of the bankrupt rm's total assets as indicated in the last
nancial statement prior to ling; promarg is the industry-adjusted prot margin, dened as pre-
ling gross margin (EBITDA divided by total sales) minus the contemporaneous median gross
margin of all Swedish rms with at least 20 employees and the same 4-digit industry code as the
sample rm; secured is the proportion of the total debt that is secured; float is the number of
oating charge debt holders; bcy1991 is a binary variable with a value of one if the bankruptcy
ling in 1991 and zero otherwise; and distress is an industry distress variable measured as the
fraction of Swedish rms with more than 20 employees sharing the same 2-digit SIC code industry
that either reports an interest coverage ratio of less than one in the year of the bankruptcy ling
or les for bankruptcy during that calendar year.
The logit model cannot be estimated directly as the parameters 
n
are determined only up
to an additive constant (i.e., one can add a constant  to each 
n
without altering the estimated
value of 
jn
). The solution is to x the set of parameters associated with one of the outcomes, and
rescale the remaining parameters relative to that "numeraire" outcome. Throughout the analysis,
we select the piecemeal liquidation outcome as the numeraire outcome (n = 1). Let
_

n
denote
the parameter value rescaled in this manner. Thus,
_

1
= 0, and
_

n
= 
n
  
1
; for n = 2; 3: The
multinomial logit model is then:
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
j1
= 1=[1 +
3
X
n=2
exp(x
0
j
_

n
)]; (17)

jn
= exp(x
0
j
_

n
)=[1 +
3
X
n=2
exp(x
0
j
_

n
)] for n = 2; 3: (18)
Panel I of table 4 shows the estimated coecient values in the vector  for each of the two outcomes
24
Generally, the likelihood function is determined by dening an index y
jn
which equals 1 if auction j results in
outcome n, and zero otherwise. Then for a total of E outcomes and N bids, the likelihood function is
L
s
=
N
Y
j=1
Y
n2E

yjn
jn
;
which (with the logit function) has a unique maximum.
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auction prepack (n = 2) and going concern sale (n = 3). The values of the likelihood-ratio test
statistics (LRT) indicate that the parameter estimates are jointly signicant (LRT=22.10 with 12
degrees of freedom).
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Since the probabilities at each stage sum to one, the parameters 
n
reported in Table 4 do not
represent partial derivatives of the probabilities with respect to each of the oer characteristics.
That is, a change in the kth oer characteristic changes all three probabilities simultaneously, so
that the partial for one probability becomes
@
n
=@x
k
= 
n
(
kn
 
3
X
e=1

ek

e
): (19)
Panel II in Table 4 shows the value of this partial derivative for all the probabilities and all the
oer characteristics, along with the imputed t-statistics. The probability of piecemeal liquidations
increase with the number of secured debtholders and with bankruptcy lings in the business cycle
downturn in the year 1991. Auction prepacks are more likely the greater the bankrupt rm's asset
size and the greater the proportion secured debt. The probability of an going concern sale is greater
the greater the number of oating charge debtholders.
Panel I of Table 5 reports the average probabilities resulting from the multinomial estimation,
as well as the probability evaluated at the mean values of the characteristics in x. Relative to the
simple outcome frequency (as reported in Panel I), the multinomial analysis lowers the probability
of piecemeal liquidation increases the probability of going-concern sale.
Panel II and III of Table 5 show the mean and median values of three alternative measures of
the bank recover rate variable r.
r
bv
= max[0;min[(v^
l
  s)=b; 1]] (20)
r
2
= E[r
b
] =
3
X
n=1

n
r
bn
(21)
r
3
= E[r
bv
] =
3
X
n=1

n
r
bvn
(22)
Recovery r
bv
is the recovery rate computed at the trustee's liquidation value estimate, v^
l
. While r
bv
25
The likelihood ratio test (LRT) compares the performance of the model to a model with only constants. The
test is distributed 
2
with degrees of freedom equal to the number of additional explanatory power.
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underestimates the true recovery by leaving out the going concern premium, it has the advantage of
being observable at the beginning of the auction. Moreover, precisely because it does not anticipate
the auction premium, it can be used as an exogenous explanatory variable for the bank's nancing
decision. Recovery rates r
2
and r
3
use the pre-ling outcome probabilities  to compute the
expectation. Thus, these two recovery rates are used to analyze the behavior of the bank prior to
ling for bankruptcy (and thus prior to learning the trustee's liquidation value estimate). Recovery
rate r
2
computes the expected recovery of the bank at the end of the auction, while r
3
computes
the expected recovery using the bank recovery at the trustee's liquidation value estimate v^
l
.
The mean (median) value of r
bv
is 0.45 (0.39), while the corresponding values for r
2
and r
3
are
0.70 (0.70) and 0.63 (0.63), respectively. The bank receives full recovery at the trustee's estimate
in approximately 80 bankruptcy lings. Moreover, in another 20 cases, the bank's receives zero
recovery at the estimated liquidation value. The intermediate cases are fairly evenly distributed
across the entire range between 0 and 1. In contrast, when weighting the recovery rates with the ex-
ante probability estimates , the frequency distribution centers on recovery rates of approximately
30% in the case of r
2
and approximately 36% in the case of r
3
, with very low frequencies for recovery
rates higher than 75% or lower than 60%.
4.3 The impact of the recovery rate on the bank's nancing decision
In this section, we use multinomial logit to estimate the probability that either the old bank or
a new bank nances the winning bid in the auction as a function of the expected recovery rate
(either r
2
or r
3
).
26
Furthermore, the vector of explanatory variables include other factor that may
be important to the bank's nancing decision, such as the degree of industry distress (distress), the
rm's pre-ling industry-adjusted prot margin (profmarg), as well as rm size (size). As before,
we use piecemeal liquidation as the numeraire outcome.
Table 6 reports results based on recovery rate r
2
, while Table 7 shows results using r
3
. In either
table, Panel I shows the coecient estimates for each of the explanatory variables, while Panel II
shows the partial derivatives with respect to the same vector of explanatory variables. The most
striking result from both tables is the strong impact of the expected recovery rate combined with
26
Note that when the bank nances the winning bid, the bidder may be either the old owner-manager or a new
owner. Thus, this category includes, but is not restricted to, salebacks nanced by the old bank.
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an insignicant impact of the other three regressors. The eect of the recovery rate, regardless
of denition r
2
or r
3
, is to increase the probability that the old bank nances the new bid, and
reduce the probability of piecemeal liquidation. The positive impact of the recovery rate on the old
bank's decision to nance the winning bid diers from the key nding of Stromberg (2000) that
the probability of a saleback increases in his saleback bias variable. The eect of the recovery rate
in Table 6 and 7 cannot be a saleback eect because the recovery rate pushes the bank to nance
the winning bid also when the buyer is a new owner (i.e., when it is not a saleback) as well as when
there are competing bids in the auction (i.e., when the saleback option is not risk-free).
We interpret the recovery eect in Tables 6 and 7 as reecting either overbidding, bank infor-
mation that bankrupt rms with high expected bank recovery are relatively valuable acquisition
targets, or both. The positive impact of the expected recovery rate is consistent with overbidding
because the smaller the old bank's expected recovery the greater the bank's incentive to nance
relatively low valuation bidders (and push for overbidding), which in turn implies greater proba-
bility that the winning bid is actually nanced by the old bank. Furthermore, the insignicance of
the distress variable, which in Stromberg (2000) increases the probability of a saleback, indicates
that the recovery variable fundamentally captures the impact of industry liquidity on the bank's
renancing decision.
4.4 Going-concern premiums and the re-sale hypothesis
Table 8 and 9 show the estimated parameters in cross-sectional regressions with the auction going-
concern premium as dependent variable. The auction premium is ln(p=v^
a
l
), as dened above.
The purpose of these regressions is twofold. First, we examine to what extent recovery rates aect
auction premiums as suggested by our overbidding argument. That is, smaller recovery rates lead to
more aggressive bidding, and thus greater auction premiums. Secondly, we want to examine whether
auction premiums are aected by re-sales arguments. That is, to what extent does industry
illiquidity, business cycle downturn and purchase of the assets by industry outsiders decrease auction
premiums. The sample in both tables exclude auction prepacks because the auction premium is
not well dened for prepacks (the trustee's liquidation value estimate incorporates knowledge of
the nal prepack price) while Panel II of each table also excludes piecemeal liquidations. The
only dierence between the two tables is that Table 9 excludes the variable interest (number of
19
interested bidders reported by the auction trustee) and includes the variable outsider indicating
that the winning bid is made by an industry outsider, as dened in Stromberg (2000).
Tables 8 and 9 uses the bank's recovery rate at the piecemeal liquidation value, r
bv
. As shown,
lower recovery rates lead to signicantly greater auction premiums. This key result, which is robust
across all regression specications, is predicted by the overbidding theory. However, overbidding is
not the only possible explanation: smaller recovery rates may be the result of rms for which growth
options (i.e., going concern value) constitute a greater proportion of total assets. Recovery rates
evaluated at the piecemeal liquidation value tend to be low for these rms. Thus, the negative
correlation between the recovery rate and the going concern value, represented by the auction
premium. Note also that there is a signicant eect of bank nancing of the winning bid that
is independent of the recovery rate. The variable bankn is consistently positive and signicant,
possibly indicating that the bank uses private information about the quality of the rm in its
decision to nance the winning bid.
There are additional interesting results in Tables 8 and 9. First, neither the number of actual bid
nor the number of interested bidders have a signicant impact on the auction premium. While this
nding is not predicted by theories of overbidding, it also does not contradict such theories. Second,
the binary variable indicating saleback to the old owner is largely insignicant. This result rejects
the suggestions by Stromberg (2000) proposition that saleback transactions take place at lower
premiums. Third, the industry distress variable, the bankruptcy 1991 dummy, and the outsider
variable all have coecients that are insignicantly dierent from zero. This is inconsistent with
asset re-sales arguments and suggests, if anything, the initial recovery rate induces old bank
participation in the auction that counteracts a tendency for re-sales in otherwise illiquid auctions.
5 Conclusion
We study the role of distressed bank debt in aecting the outcome of Swedish bankruptcy auctions.
The auction determines the going-concern premium, i.e., the premium over the piecemeal liquidation
value to be paid for the right to acquire the bankrupt rm as a going concern. We show that since
the distressed debt is akin to an equity position ('creditor toehold'), the bank has an incentive
to nance a bidder and to induce the coalition to overbid. Moreover, the coalition's optimal bid
20
equals the revenue-maximizing reservation price of a monopolist seller of the bankrupt rm. The
empirical analysis identies signicant creditor toehold eects: the greater the toehold, the greater
the winning going-concern premium, as predicted. Moreover, controlling for the creditor toehold,
there is no evidence that the going-concern premium is lower in business cycle downturns, in
distressed industries, for sales back to the rm's old owners, or when sold to industry outsiders.
Thus, there is no support for asset re-sale arguments, possibly because bidding with creditor
toehold helps counteract re-sale tendencies in relatively illiquid auctions.
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Table 1
Auction characteristics classified by bankruptcy outcome. Total sample of 263
Swedish firms filing for auction bankruptcy 1988-1991.
No of
cases
Average
(median)
no of
“interested
bidders”
per case
Average
(median)
no of
actual
bids per
case
Average
(median)
no of days
in bidding
period1
No of
cases
with old
bank
financing
No of
cases
with new
bank
financing
No of
cases
with no
bank
financing
I.  Total sample of bankruptcy filings
263 5.5
(3.0)
3.6
(2.0)
27.0
(15)
62 62 3
II.  Going concern auctions
All 147 5.7
(3.0)
3.3
(2.0)
25.3
(15)
42 47 3
Sale-backs 90 5.3
(3.0)
3.0
(1.0)
23.4
(15.0)
30 29 3
New owner 50 6.2
(4.0)
3.7
(3.0)
27.0
(15.0)
12 16 0
III.  Auction prepacks (going concern sales)
All 53 1.5
(1.0)
1.2
(1.0)
n/a 20 15 0
Sale-backs 32 1.2
(1.0)
1.2
(1.0)
n/a 15 9 0
New owner 17 1.1
(1.0)
1.0
(1.0)
n/a 5 5 0
IV.  Piecemeal liquidations
60 12.1
(6.0)
9.8
(5.0)
15.7
(10.0)
1 This is the number of days in the period during which the trustee accepts bids in the auction for the
bankrupt firm’s assets.
Table 2
Average (median) auction premiums and recovery rates classified by bankruptcy
outcome. Sample of 263 Swedish firms filing for auction bankruptcy 1988-1991.
Auction
premium (%)1
Total recovery
rate (%)2
Bank recovery
rate (%)2
Bank recovery
rate at lvˆ  (%)
3
I.  Total sample of bankruptcy filings
96.7
(6.3)
34.5
(33.1)
69.3
(82.8)
62.2
(72.2)
II.  Going concern auctions4
All 125.3
(13.5)
39.0
(38.1)
76.3
(89.3)
65.6
(76.8)
Sale-backs 130.9
(13.5)
38.2
(37.2)
77.0
(97.2)
67.4
(78.0)
New owner 114.3
(6.7)
40.3
(41.0)
75.0
(83.9)
63.0
(77.0)
III.  Auction prepacks (going concern sales)4, 5
All n/a 32.1
(31.3)
77.1
(91.3)
n/a
Sale-backs n/a 28.7
(31.8)
74.5
(84.5)
n/a
New owner n/a 36.6
(29.5)
76.7
(99.1)
n/a
IV.  Piecemeal liquidations
7.6
(1.6)
25.6
(21.2)
45.7
(40.4)
45.3
(40.0)
1 The auction premium is defined as 1ˆ/ -alvp , where p is the price received in the auction and 
a
lvˆ  is the
trustee’s liquidation value estimate of the assets sold in the auction.
2 Recovery rate is the payoff to debtholders in bankruptcy as a fraction of the face value of the debt claims.
3 Let lvˆ  be the trustee’s estimate of the total liquidation value of the firm (which exceeds 
a
lvˆ  when assets,
such as accounts receivables and other financial claims, are excluded from the auction). The bank recovery
rate at lvˆ is defined as ]]1,/)ˆmin[(,0max[ bsvr lbv -º , where s and f are the face values of the debt
senior to the bank and the bank’s debt, respectively.
4 Due to missing information, the “All” categories contain more cases than the sub categories.
5 Auction premiums as defined in this paper are not relevant for auction prepacks since the estimate of alvˆ
is made after the final going concern price has been negotiated.
Table 3
Summary statistics of the explanatory variables used in multinomial logit estimation
of the probability for bankruptcy outcomes prior to the bankruptcy filing.
Variable Mean Median
Standard
deviation
Log of prefiling book value of assets (siz ) 15.98 15.92 1.055
Industry-adjusted profit margin (p ofmarg)1 -0.58 -0.40 0.137
Fraction secured debt (secured) 0.390 0.380 0.247
Number of floating charge debt holders (float) 1.14 1.00 0.650
Dummy variable indicating bankruptcy filing in
1991 (bcy1991)
0.59 1.00 0.490
Industry distress (distress)2 0.423 0.377 0.161
1 The difference between the firm’s profit margin, defined as EBITDA divided by sales, and the median
profit margin of Swedish firms with more than 20 employees sharing the same 4-digit SIC code industry.
2 Fraction of Swedish firms with more than 20 employees sharing the same 2-digit SIC code industry that
either reports an interest coverage of less than one in the year of bankruptcy filing, or files for bankruptcy
during that calendar year.
Table 4
Maximum likelihood estimates of the coefficients in a multinomial logit estimation of the probability for bankruptcy outcomes prior to the
bankruptcy filing. Bankruptcy outcome is classified as piecemeal liquidation (y=1), auction prepack (y=2) or going concern sale (y=3).
Panel II reports the partial derivatives of probabilities with respect to the vector of characteristics computed at the variable means.
Sample of 257 Swedish firms filing for auction bankruptcy 1988-1991.
Explanatory variables
Bankruptcy outcome: constant size profmarg secured float bcy1991 distress
I. Coefficient estimates of explanatory variables (p-value)1
Auction prepack (p2) -7.144
(0.036)
0.373
(0.065)
1.762
(0.240)
-2.400
(0.010)
-0.013
(0.971)
1.217
(0.017)
3.320
(0.047)
Going concern sale (p3) -0.145
(0.668)
0.070
(0.665)
1.083
(0.312)
-1.042
(0.153)
0.461
(0.099)
0.648
(0.098)
1.356
(0.320)
N=257, Log likelihood=-245.52, LRT=-22.10, df=12
II. Partial derivatives of probabilities with respect to vector of explanatory variables (p-value)2
Piecemeal liquidation (p1) 0.452
(0.320)
-0.025
(0.364)
-0.215
(0.247)
0.237
(0.072)
-0.059
(0.224)
-0.136
(0.059)
-0.317
(0.181)
Auction prepack (p2) 0.980
(0.049)
0.050
(0.076)
0.151
(0.471)
-0.255
(0.057)
-0.054
(0.244)
0.116
(0.109)
0.362
(0.111)
Going concern sale (p3) 0.528
(0.315)
-0.025
(0.428)
0.064
(0.785)
0.018
(0.902)
0.113
(0.044)
0.020
(0.801)
-0.046
(0.863)
1 The multinomial estimation necessarily normalizes to zero the coefficients for one of the outcomes (in this case piecemeal liquidation). The multinomial logit
model has the following general form: )(exp/)exp(
3
1
nj
n
njjn xx bbp ¢å¢=
=
where there are K=7 firm-specific characteristics in the (K´1) vector of explanatory
variables xj, bn is the (7´1) vector of parameters, and there are a total of three possible outcomes. The likelihood ratio test (LRT) compares the performance of
the model to a model with only constants. The test is distributed as C2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number of additional explanatory variables.
 2 The partial derivatives reported in the table are given by )(/
3
1
å-=¶¶
=e
eekknnkn x pbbpp .
Table 5
Probabilities for bankruptcy outcomes implied by the multinomial logit estimation,
and the mean and median values of three alternative measures of bank recovery
rate.
Piecemeal
liquidation
Auction
prepack
Going
concern sale
I. Pre-filing probabilities (p) for auction bankruptcy outcomes
Average probability 0.226 0.206 0.568
Probability at the mean value of x 0.221 0.192 0.587
Simple outcome frequency 0.231 0.204 0.565
II. Mean (median) bank recovery rate at the trustee’s liquidation value estimate2
Bank recovery l at the trustee’s liquidation
value estimate:
]]1,/)ˆmin[(,0max[ bsvr lbv -=
0.453
(0.390)
0.738
(0.960)
0.656
(0.768)
III. Expected bank recovery rate using pre-filing outcome probabilities (p)2
Mean Median Std. dev.
Expected bank recovery rate r2 using average
bank recovery bn:
bn
n
nrr å
=
=
3
1
2 p
0.696 0.700 0.0259
Expected bank recovery rate r3 using average
bank recovery bvn at the trustee’s liquidation
value estimatelvˆ :
bvn
n
nrr å
=
=
3
1
3 p
0.627 0.628 0.0227
1 See Table 2 for the average bank recovery rate (bvnr ) at he trustee’s liquidation value estimate lvˆ  across
outcomes n. The variables s and b are the face values of the debt senior to the bank and the bank’s debt,
respectively.
2 See Table 2 for the average bank recovery rate (bnr ) across states n.
Table 6
Maximum likelihood estimates of the coefficients of a multinomial logit model for
the probability of the bank’s financing decision in the bankruptcy auction using r2
as the bank recovery rate definition (the expected bank recovery rate given the
average realized bank recovery in each outcome). Sample of 185 firms filing for
Swedish auction bankruptcy, 1988-1991.1
Explanatory variables
Bankruptcy outcome constant r2 distress profmarg size
I. Coefficient estimates of explanatory variables (p-value)1
Old bank finances winning bid (p2) 13.539
(0.004)
36.314
(0.000)
-0.170
(0.899)
-0.459
(0.781)
-0.153
(0.418)
New bank finances winning bid (p3) 1.986
(0.633)
14.818
(0.069)
0.120
(0.926)
-0.740
(0.566)
0.162
(0.360)
N=185, Log likelihood=-192.26, LRT=21.57, df=8
II. Partial derivatives of probabilities with respect to vector of explanatory variables (p-value)2
Piecemeal liquidation (p1) -1.571
(0.072)
-5.308
(0.006)
0.003
(0.990)
0.131
(0.623)
-0.003
(0.918)
Old bank finances winning bid (p2) 2.707
(0.011)
6.139
(0.008)
-0.051
(0.835)
-0.012
(0.970)
-0.052
(0.157)
New bank finances winning bid (p3) -1.135
(0.191)
-0.832
(0.615)
0.048
(0.850)
-0.118
(0.675)
0.056
(0.130)
1 The multinomial logit model has the following general form: )(exp/)exp(
3
1
nj
n
njjn xx bbp ¢å¢=
=
where
there are K=5 firm-specific characteristics in the (K´1) vector of explanatory variables xj, n i the (5´1)
vector of parameters, and there are a total of three possible outcomes. The likelihood ratio test (LRT)
compares the performance of the model to a model with only constants. The test is distributed as C2 w th
degrees of freedom equal to the number of additional explanatory variables.
 2 The partial derivatives reported in the table are given by )(/
3
1
å-=¶¶
=e
eekknnkn x pbbpp .
Table 7
Maximum likelihood estimates of the coefficients of a multinomial logit model for
the probability of the bank’s financing decision in the bankruptcy auction using r3
as the bank recovery rate variable (the expected recovery rate using the average
bank recovery at the trustee’s liquidation value estimate). Sample of 185 firms filing
for Swedish auction bankruptcy, 1988-1991.
Explanatory variables
Bankruptcy outcome constant r3 distress profmarg size
I. Coefficient estimates of explanatory variables (p-value)1
Old bank finances winning bid (p2) 17.878
(0.002)
39.084
(0.000)
-0.616
(0.647)
-0.111
(0.945)
-0.189
(0.312)
New bank finances winning bid (p3) 2.764
(0.597)
13.817
(0.152)
-0.002
(0.998)
-0.400
(0.752)
0.158
(0.378)
N=185, Log likelihood=-192.96, LRT=20.15, df=8
II. Partial derivatives of probabilities with respect to vector of explanatory variables (p-value)2
Piecemeal liquidation (p1) -2.104
(0.058)
-5.492
(0.013)
0.062
(0.803)
0.057
(0.827)
0.001
(0.981)
Old bank finances winning bid (p2) 3.568
(0.007)
6.885
(0.006)
-0.133
(0.592)
0.023
(0.942)
-0.060
(0.114)
New bank finances winning bid (p3) -1.463
(0.175)
-1.392
(0.465)
0.072
(0.778)
-0.080
(0.770)
0.059
(0.115)
1 The multinomial logit model has the following general form: )(exp/)exp(
3
1
nj
n
njjn xx bbp ¢å¢=
=
where there
are K=5 firm-specific characteristics in the (K´1) v ctor of explanatory variables xj, n i the (5´1) vector
of parameters, and there are a total of three possible outcomes. The likelihood ratio test (LRT) compares
the performance of the model to a model with only constants. The test is distributed as C2 with degrees of
freedom equal to the number of additional explanatory variables.
 2 The partial derivatives reported in the table are given by )(/
3
1
å-=¶¶
=e
eekknnkn x pbbpp .
Table 8
Coefficient in OLS estimations of the auction going-concern premium. The bank recovery rate rbv is calculated at the trustee’s liquidation
value estimate. Subsample of 173 Swedish firms auctioned in  bankruptcy 1988-1991, excluding auction prepacks.1
Explanatory variables
con-
stant size
prof-
marg rbv interest bids distress
bcy
1991
piece-
meal
sale-
back bankfin
Adjus-
ted R2 F-value n
I. Coefficients for OLS regressions of the going concern premium (p-value). Sample of going concern sales and piecemeal liquidations.
0.382
(0.709)
-0.023
(0.703)
-0.030
(0.947)
-0.742
(0.000)
0.306
(0.603)
-0.072
(0.681)
-0.569
(0.000)
0.122
(df=6)
4.993
(0.000)
173
0.264
(0.788)
-0.023
(0.704)
-0.037
(0.993)
-0.728
(0.000)
0.493
(0.266)
-0.560
(0.000)
0.126
(df=5)
5.987
(0.000)
173
0.314
(0.762)
-0.036
(0.544)
-0.081
(0.852)
-0.771
(0.000)
0.521
(0.424)
-0.058
(0.751)
-0.394
(0.170)
0.259
(0.086)
0.136
(df=7)
4.762
(0.000)
168
0.355
(0.754)
0.026
(0.739)
-0.271
(0.549)
-0.848
(0.000)
0.025
(0.996)
-0.539
(0.002)
0.354
(0.043)
0.192
(df=6)
6.026
(0.000)
127
0.062
(0.958)
-0.013
(0.849)
-0.263
(0.561)
-0.874
(0.000)
0.033
(0.965)
0.064
(0.758)
-0.363
(0.087)
0.247
(0.202)
0.358
(0.043)
0.196
(df=8)
4.838
(0.000)
126
II. Coefficients for OLS regressions of the going concern premium (p-value). Sample of going concern sales.
0.965
(0.483)
-0.062
(0.451)
-0.611
(0.540)
-1.257
(0.000)
-0.319
(0.593)
0.366
(0.034)
0.253
(df=5)
6.540
(0.000)
82
0.608
(0.669)
-0.054
(0.517)
-0.617
(0.533)
-1.279
(0.000)
-0.155
(0.797)
0.192
(0.290)
0.376
(0.029)
0.273
(df=6)
6.073
(0.000)
81
1.988
(0.275)
-0.134
(0.201)
-1.059
(0.446)
-1.316
(0.001)
-0.018
(0.721)
-0.371
(0.765)
0.051
(0.872)
0.457
(0.067)
0.242
(df=7)
3.322
(0.006)
51
1.377
(0.451)
-0.112
(0.283)
-1.013
(0.450)
-1.326
(0.000)
0.027
(0.578)
-0.222
(0.812)
0.291
(0.226)
0.479
(0.049)
0.303
(df=7)
4.098
(0.002)
50
2.295
(0.194)
-0.139
(0.179)
-1.270
(0.362)
-1.304
(0.000)
-0.052
(0.322)
0.058
(0.368)
-0.696
(0.465)
0.521
(0.040)
0.258
(df=7)
3.535
(0.004)
51
1 The auction premium is defined as ( )alvp ˆ/ln , where p is the price received in the auction and alvˆ  is the trustee’s liquidation value estimate for the assets sold in
the going-concern auction. The bank recovery rate at alvˆ  is d fined as bsvr
a
lbv /)ˆ( -º , where s and b are the face values of the debt senior to the bank and the
bank’s debt, respectively.
Table 9
Coefficients in OLS estimations of the auction going-concern premium. The bank recovery rate bv is calculated at the trustee’s
liquidation value estimate. Subsample of 173 Swedish firms auctioned in  bankruptcy 1988-1991, excluding auction prepacks.1
Explanatory variables
con-
stant size
prof-
marg rbv bids distress
bcy
1991
piece-
meal saleback bankfin outsider
Adjus-
ted R2 F-value n
I. Coefficients for OLS regressions of the going concern premium (p-value). Sample of going concern sales and piecemeal liquidations.
-0.462
(0.687)
0.003
(0.959)
-0.220
(0.628)
-0.798
(0.000)
0.268
(0.613)
0.340
(0.119)
0.418
(0.019)
-0.135
(0.558)
0.184
(df=7)
5.061
(0.000)
126
0.326
(0.775)
-0.022
(0.767)
-0.268
(0.556)
-0.843
(0.000)
0.026
(0.966)
-0.500
(0.025)
0.342
(0.059)
-0.058
(0.782)
0.186
(df=7)
5.136
(0.000)
127
0.318
(0.786)
-0.021
(0.767)
-0.269
(0.557)
-0.841
(0.000)
0.042
(0.956)
0.001
(0.971)
-0.500
(0.026)
0.342
(0.060)
-0.058
(0.785)
0.179
(df=8)
4.457
(0.000)
127
0.251
(0.797)
-0.021
(0.721)
-0.078
(.859)
-0.741
(0.000)
0.583
(0.191)
-0.413
(0.018)
-0.223
(0.145)
0.132
(df=6)
5.380
(0.000)
173
II. Coefficients for OLS regressions of the going concern premium (p-value). Sample of going concern sales.
0.997
(0.473)
-0.064
(.440)
-.588
(.560)
-1.263
(0.000)
-.359
(.561)
.379
(.035)
0.066
(.781)
0.243
(df=6)
5.398
(0.000)
82
2.083
(0.238)
-0.135
(0.195)
-0.993
(0.476)
-1.368
(0.000)
0.014
(.781)
-.564
(.554)
0.483
(0.056)
0.123
(0.678)
0.244
(df=7)
3.354
(0.006)
51
0.645
(0.658)
0.058
(0.513)
0.528
(0.656)
-0.974
(0.000)
0.021
(0.376)
1.070
(0.133)
-0.222
(0.307)
0.157
(df=6)
3.510
(0.004)
81
1 The auction premium is defined as ( )alvp ˆ/ln , where p is the price received in the auction and alvˆ  is the trustee’s liquidation value estimate for the assets sold in
the going-concern auction. The bank recovery rate at the trustee’s liquidation value estimate, alvˆ , is defined as bsvr
a
lbv /)ˆ( -º , where sand b are the face
values of the debt senior to the bank and the bank’s debt, respectively.
Figure 1
The reservation price pm* which maximizes expected revenue for a monopolist seller
of the bankrupt firm in an open, ascending auction with zero bidding costs. Bidders’
private valuations v have distribution and density functions G(v) and g(v), respec-
tively, and the seller owns a=100% of the firm. The seller’s opportunity cost is vm.
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Figure 2
The efficiency of outcomes from overbidding p* in the bankruptcy auction by the
coalition of the bank and bidder 1. It is assumed that p*<s+b, where b and s are the
face values of the bank’s debt and debt senior to the bank’s claim, respectively. The
private valuations of bidders 1 and 2 are denoted v1 and v2, respectively.
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Figure 3
Expected overbidding p*-v1 as a function of truncated private valuation
e*=max[s+b-vl,0], where b and s are the face values of bank debt and debt senior to
the bank, respectively, and vl is the (common) piecemeal liquidation value at the
start of the auction.
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Figure 4
Key outcomes in Swedish bankruptcy.
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Figure 5
Frequency distribution for the number of “interested bidders” in Swedish
bankruptcy auctions. Sample of 94 going concern sales, 1988-1992
0
5
10
15
20
25
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39
Frequency
Number of
interested
bidders
Figure 6
Frequency distribution for the number of actual bids in Swedish bankruptcy
auctions. Sample of 89 going concern sales, 1988-1992.
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